My investment thesis is straightforward: over the next decade, markets will increasingly reward secure, politically aligned supply chains, not simply the lowest-cost producers. Energy security and strategic materials are becoming matters of national policy, and when that happens, pricing, capital flows, and valuations change structurally.

That’s why I’m concentrated in uranium and rare earth companies that sit outside China and inside Western-aligned supply chains.

My core holdings are Energy Fuels (UUUU), Cameco (CCJ), Centrus Energy (LEU), MP Materials (MP), and Lynas (LYSDY). $300k USD invested.

I chose these US/US allied companies because they represent critical choke points in supply chains that the United States and the West utilities cannot easily replace. Together, they cover uranium mining, nuclear fuel conversion and enrichment, and rare earth production and processing outside of China. China controls the majority of these rare earths and, following Venezeula, supply restrictions are only going to get worse. We’re in the hoarding era….

The recent events in Venezuela are mostly being discussed as an oil story, but I think that framing misses the larger signal. Whether oil supply increases or not is secondary. The more important takeaway is geopolitical: the United States has shown it is willing to act decisively when strategic interests are involved. That reinforces a world where energy, materials, and supply chains are increasingly treated as matters of security rather than free-market commodities.

Uranium is heavily regulated and sold primarily through long-term contracts with utilities that plan fuel needs years in advance. Rare earths require not just mining, but complex processing infrastructure that takes a decade or more to develop. There is no mechanism for sudden supply flooding in either market.

History supports this view. During the 2006–2007 uranium bull run, prices did not rise because of speculative demand alone. They rose because utilities realized they were under-contracted in a tightening market and rushed to secure long-term supply. Once utilities began competing for material, prices moved violently and quickly, and equities re-rated far beyond what traditional valuation models anticipated. Rare earths experienced a similar dynamic a few years later when export controls and geopolitical tension exposed how fragile global supply really was. I expect a very similar situation to take place between 2026-2028. After Venezuela, the last thing China will do is flood the market with their supply leading to a supply constraint that will enable rare earths and uranium to Sky-rocket. Just look at how commodities reacted yesterday…

Those episodes weren’t driven by economic growth cycles — they were driven by procurement crises. When utilities and governments fear supply disruption, they don’t negotiate for the best price; they secure supply at almost any price.

That historical lesson matters today. Nuclear power is expanding globally, enrichment capacity is constrained, and non-China rare earth supply remains limited. At the same time, geopolitical risk is rising, not falling. If tensions escalate further — particularly around Taiwan — the immediate market reaction would likely be risk-off across all assets. But the second-order effect would be a rapid acceleration of industrial policy, subsidies, and long-term contracts favoring Western-aligned suppliers of uranium and strategic materials.

I’m not positioned for a short-term commodity spike. I’m positioned for a world where governments and utilities prioritize certainty of supply over cost, just as they did in prior cycles. In those environments, uranium and rare earth equities don’t behave like normal commodities — they behave like strategic infrastructure.